. Glossary of Governance and Takeover Germs
Upper support parameter of the range of the shareholder premium preference distribution U [0,(1 -N) n s ].
n s
Random variable associated with the shareholder premium preference distribution.
n a
Upper support parameter of the range of the acquirer's distribution U [0,(1 -N) n a ] of the private premium value for the target firm. n a Random variable associated with the acquirer's private premium value distribution. c Variable denoting board entrenchment as a premium demanded by the board under delegated-governance. k Bargaining power of the target firm under delegated-governance.
q Voting rule that determines the minimum proportion of votes required in favor of a successful takeover under owner-governance.
W
Value of benefits to the target firm board as an independent firm. p Variable denoting the takeover offer premium. γ
Parameter that determines reputational value (γ @ p) to the target firm board from a successful takeover premium.
Proof of Lemma 1
The parties are modeled to maximize the Nash Product of the expected gains from bargaining:
(1) 
Proof of Lemma 2 Board's Endogenous Entrenchment
Case 1: When entrenchment is such that c < k(1 -N)n a , the board maximizes its expected benefits through the objective function, 
[ ] ( ) ( Hence, we generate the three-part solution to the board's optimal entrenchment as
Theoretical Benchmark Entrenchment
Case 1: When entrenchment is such that
, the shareholders expected surplus is maximized,
Which leads to the first order condition . Therefore, the case 1 condition simplifies to 1 / 2 1 k < < .
Hence, we generate the two-part solution to the benchmark entrenchment as ( )
This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1
Case 1: When ( ) ( )( )
, from Lemma 2, the difference in entrenchment between the board's endogenous level and the benchmark case is
Case 2: When ( ) ( )( )
, from Lemma 2, the difference in entrenchment between the board's endogenous entrenchment level and the benchmark case is
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition
(ii) From case 2 in Lemma 2 we have 
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof requires comparison of the shareholder surplus derived using the results from Lemma 2 for the board's endogenous entrenchment level and the theoretical benchmark entrenchment. This comparison generates two cases: 
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Taking the first derivative of this difference with respect to informedness, we obtain
It is readily seen that the derivative (11) is always positive. Therefore, the difference is increasing with informedness. 
It is readily seen that the derivative (12) is always positive. Therefore, the difference is increasing with informedness. 
It can be seen that the derivative (13) is positive when ( )
It is readily seen that 1 1 / 2 k ≥ Therefore, the difference is increasing with informedness when 1 1 / 2 k k ≤ < , and decreasing with informedness when
Proof of Proposition 3
Shareholder surplus is computed from the results of Lemma 2, and there are two cases to be considered. in (7) to derive the expected shareholder surplus:
Expected shareholders surplus conditional on a takeover is derived by dividing the expression in (14) by the probability of a takeover:
Dividing (14) by (15) provides shareholder surplus conditional on a takeover: (
2 1 ,
The derivative of (16) is as follows:
Examining (17) to derive the conditions on bargaining power when this slope is negative provides two quadratic roots:
because the second term is negative. We can also restate the Case 1 condition as
, and we must have
. Therefore, we must have
, and this requirement reduces to L W < . This is a contradiction because we also must have
is not feasible and is eliminated leaving the only feasible solution
. We confirm directionality using parameter values { } 
E S takeover k
Thus, we obtain the result
We can restate the results in expanded form as follows:
The next part is to determine the point at which the results switch from Case 1 to Case 2, to determine the threshold of bargaining power 1 / 2 k > above which Case 1 is in force. We obtain this threshold by comparing the case1 and case 2 optimal entrenchment level * c from the result in Lemma 2 expressed in equation (6) and solving for bargaining power.
Solving (19) for bargain power generates the result (7) to derive the expected shareholder surplus:
It can be readily seen that (20) and (21) are independent of bargaining power. Hence, we have
Therefore, in this case expected shareholder surplus conditional on a takeover does not change with bargaining power.
Proof of Lemma 3
Informed about the random draw of the parameterˆs n , a rational acquirer will always bid ˆs q n × provided ˆâ s n q n ≥ × . The expected shareholder surplus is therefore, 
And, solving the shareholders' maximization problem generates the optimal voting rule
Applying this optimal voting rule to (23) provides the result ( ) ( 
Similarly, the expected acquirer surplus is ( ) 
The total available surplus is
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of Proposition 4 is available in Appendix B.
Proof of Proposition 5
The probability of a takeover under owner-governance is computed as follows:
The probability of a takeover under delegated-governance is computed as follows: (28) and (29) respectively we obtain
It is immediately clear that 0,
and we also obtain:
(ii) Next, compare the probability of a takeover between the governance structures.
. The difference in the probability of a takeover between owner-governance and delegated-governance from (30) and (31) 
Proof of Proposition 6
The proof consists of taking the difference in shareholder surplus between the two governance regimes and solving for informedness. Shareholder surplus under delegated-governance is obtained by substituting the endogenous board entrenchment level from (6) into the expressions for shareholder surplus given by (7) and (8). Shareholder surplus under owner-governance is obtained from Lemma 3 and the expression in (25). This comparison gives rise to four conditions that are analyzed below.
Case 1a: ( ) ( )( )
. The difference in shareholder surplus between owner-governance and delegated-governance is as follows:
Solving for informedness φ in (36) generates only one feasible solution because 1 φ < :
Directionality is readily verified using parameter values { } 
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Solving for informedness φ in (38) generates only one feasible solution because 1 φ < :
Solving for informedness φ in (40) 
We have already seen from Case 1a that owner-governance always provides greater shareholder surplus than delegated-governance when informedness is sufficiently high and 4 / 3 
Solving for informedness φ in (42) 
We have already seen from Case 1b that owner-governance always provides greater shareholder surplus than delegated-governance when informedness is sufficiently high and 4 / 3 a s n n < . In this case, the only difference with Case 1b is that we have the changed condition 
Proof of Proposition 7
The proof consists of taking the difference in acquirer surplus between the two governance structures and solving for informedness. Expected acquirer surplus under owner-governance is given in (26) from Lemma 3. Expected acquirer surplus under delegated-governance is obtained as follows:
Substitute the endogenous board entrenchment level from (6) into the expression for acquirer surplus given by (44) and (45) 
Solving for informedness φ in (46) 
Note that the condition ( ) 0.5, 0.5625 k ∈ is necessary because a non-negative value is needed under the square root sign in (47) 
. In other words, delegated-governance provides greater acquirer surplus when 
We have already seen from Case 1a that owner-governance always provides greater acquirer surplus than delegated-governance when informedness is sufficiently high and 4 / 3 a s n n < . In this case, the only difference with Case 1a is that we have the changed condition 4 / 3 a s n n ≥ . From Lemma 3 and expression (26) 
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. The difference in acquirer surplus between owner-governance and delegatedgovernance is as follows:
We have already seen from Case 1b that owner-governance always provides greater acquirer surplus than delegated-governance when 
Proof of Proposition 8
The proof consists of taking the difference in joint surplus between the two governance structures and solving for informedness. Joint surplus is obtained by adding the shareholder surplus and acquirer surplus from the proofs for Proposition 5 and Proposition 6. The entrenchment level applied is the endogenous board entrenchment level from (6). Joint surplus for owner-governance is obtained from Lemma 3. Directionality with respect to increasing informedness for the preference for owner-governance has been established in the proofs for Propositions 6 and 7. Hence joint surplus must have the same directionality because it is the sum of shareholder surplus and acquirer surplus. This comparison gives rise to four conditions that are analyzed below.
. The difference in joint surplus between owner-governance and delegatedgovernance is as follows:
Solving for informedness φ in (52) 
It is immediately apparent that (54) 
Solving for informedness φ in (55) generates only one feasible solution because 1 φ < :
. The difference in joint surplus between owner-governance and delegatedgovernance is as follows: 
Appendix B Proof of Proposition 4
Model of Owner-Governance: Shareholder Preference Distribution Parameter ˆs n Is a Random Variable, with an Uninformed Acquirer
In the section analyzing owner-governance within the main body of the paper, the acquirer was informed of the realized shareholder preference distribution [ ] 0, s U n . In this section, all parties are uninformed regarding the realized shareholder preference distribution. The shareholders determine an ex ante voting rule without having the benefit of such information. The sequence of steps is as described in Table 2 , in the main body of the article, except for the following change in the information set.
The target firm shareholders and acquirer are uninformed regarding the realized shareholder preference distribution [ ]
For notational compactness, the distributions 
Lemma B1 reports the optimal voting rule and the resulting expected surplus for the target shareholders, acquirer surplus, and joint surplus when the acquirer is uninformed about ˆs n . Because the acquirer is uninformed, the optimal strategy for the acquirer is to make an offer that is independent of any information regarding the target firm shareholder preferences.
Uncertainty in the shareholder preference distribution hurts target firm shareholders. The intuition behind the decrease in surplus is that there are too many possible low surplus transactions and too few high surplus transactions. High surplus transactions require (1) high valuation for the target firm by the acquirer and (2) a high value of the shareholder preference distribution parameter. Whereas this combination delivers high surplus for the shareholders, such potential transactions are too few in number. In contrast, low surplus transactions occur when there is (1) high valuation for the target firm by the acquirer and (2) a low value of the shareholder preference distribution parameter. This combination delivers low surplus for the shareholders but are more in number compared to high surplus transactions. The net effect is that the low surplus transactions dominate, reducing the expected payoff compared to the previous model with no uncertainty in the distribution parameter.
Counterintuitively, the addition of the stochastic attribute to the shareholder preference distribution parameter increases the acquirer's expected surplus. Uncertainty regarding the shareholder preference distribution benefits the acquirer. The intuition behind the acquirer's surplus increase is from the combination of (1) high valuation for the target firm by the acquirer and (2) a low value of the shareholder preference distribution parameter. This combination delivers high surplus to the acquirer and are large in number relative to low surplus combinations for the acquirer, (1) high valuation for the target firm by the acquirer and (2) a high value of the shareholder preference distribution parameter. The very combination that is surplus-reducing to the target firm shareholders is surplus-enhancing for the acquirer.
Proof of Lemma B1
Because the acquirer has no information regarding ˆs n the solution to the game is not straightforward. The solution requires backward induction in a two-stage game and includes two variables viz. the optimal voting rule and the optimal offer premium. The common information set for both parties are the two distributions
The realizationˆs n is unknown and the realized valuation of the target firm by the acquirer ˆa n is the private information of the acquirer. The sequence of actions is as follows: (1) in the first stage, the shareholders determine an optimal q and (2) in the second stage, the acquirer, given the existence of this q, will determine an optimal premium or price factor p that is applied to the realized valuation ˆa n such that the offer is ( ) a p n ⋅
. Unlike the previous cases where q could be assumed to be fixed, here it is varying against p and a one-dimensional approach to the optimization is not applicable. Intuitively, what is taking place is that for any given [0,1] q ∈ , the acquirer has a best response price factor p. Knowing this best response strategy profile of the acquirer, the shareholder will select the optimal q. Both variables p, q are being optimized under random draws from their respective Uniform probability distributions. Therefore, a convolution of the two distributions of the random variables ˆ, s a n n is required. In setting up the convolution we take advantage of the fact that a transaction can consummate only if 
Backward Induction: Stage 2
Whenever a transaction consummates, the acquirer generates a premium surplus of ( )â a n pn − . The target firm has a voting rule q in place and the acquirer computes expected surplus using the convolution of two independent Uniform distributions. The general solution is trapezoidal in form (Killmann and von Collani 2001; Olds 1952 ) and has three terms as follows: 
The first term disappears as there are no transactions in this region and the second and third terms remain. The surplus from (1) is evaluated over the probability density function of ˆa n and we have the following: 
The acquirer's optimization problem is Depending on the final solution to the price factor p, it may appear that there may be the need for setting an upper limit of 1 on p, but it is soon evident that this will not be necessary. Thus, we have the optimal response profile for any voting rule that the shareholder may apply.
Backward Induction: Stage 1
The shareholders now know the best response profile of the acquirer from (3) and from this they compute their expected surplus. Note that a consummated transaction delivers a surplus of *ˆa p n ⋅ to the shareholder. The expected shareholder surplus is therefore:
